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Abstract 
 
This article reviews the Thailand monetary policy rule and its performance under the 
adoption of inflation targeting regime since 2000. The study estimates the policy reaction 
function to see if the inflation targeting has been linked with an inflation-responsive 
monetary policy rule, and investigates whether the monetary policy rule would actually 
have its transmission effect on inflation, through tracing the impulse responses of inflation 
rate to monetary policy shocks in vector autoregressive (VAR) and structural VAR models. 
The study contributes to the literature by updating the assessment of the Thailand 
monetary policy through covering the period after 2015, when the Bank of Thailand has 
upgraded its inflation targeting framework by transforming it from range target to point 
target to provide a clearer policy signal to the public. The main findings are as follows. 
The estimation outcomes of the policy reaction function show that the Thailand monetary 
policy rule under the inflation targeting is characterized as an inflation- and exchange-
rate- responsive rule with forward-looking manner, which is countercyclical against 
inflation in the long run, but is accompanied with slow adjustment toward a target policy 
rate. The results from the impulse response analyses imply that the Thailand monetary 
policy under the inflation targeting has only a marginal transmission effect on inflation 
probably due to the slow adjustment of policy rate. 
 
Keyword: Monetary policy rule, Inflation targeting, The Bank of Thailand, Policy 
reaction function, and Vector autoregressive model  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Bank of Thailand has adopted “inflation targeting” as its monetary policy 
framework since May 2000.1 The background behind introducing inflation targeting lies 
in the currency crisis named “Tom Yum Goong Crisis” in July 1997. In this crisis Thailand 
abandoned pegged currency regime and switched to floating exchange rate system. Then 
it became necessary for the authority to identify a new policy anchor with a main objective 
of maintaining price stability. As Mishkin (2000) argued, inflation targeting has become 
an alternative nominal anchor to stabilize inflation instead of pegged currency regime. 
The question then arises on how we can evaluate the inflation target that has been 
operated for around two decades since its adoption in Thailand. In general, there seems 
to be a consensus in academic literature and policy discussions that inflation targeting has 
so far been successful to stabilize inflation in advanced economies with their long 
histories of its adoption since the 1990s (e.g. Mishkin and Posen, 1998; Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). As far as emerging market economies including Thailand are 
concerned, however, there have been rather less evidence to support the performance of 
inflation targeting due to their relatively shorter histories of its adoption and to some 
difficulties in its management. 
The difficulties that emerging market economies have faced in operating their 
inflation targeting might come from exchange rate fluctuations for the following senses. 
First, inflation targeting can work well only when monetary autonomy is secured under 
floating exchange rate regime with capital mobility. Emerging market economies have, 
however, the problem of a “fear of floating”, as suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
It comes from a lack of confidence in currency value, especially given that their external 
debt is primarily denominated in US dollars. Their efforts to avoid exchange rate volatility 
prevent their monetary authorities from concentrating fully on inflation targeting. Second, 
as Eichengreen (2002) argued, exchange rate fluctuation itself has large influence on 
domestic prices through the “pass-through” effect in small, open economies. It makes it 
difficult for the monetary authorities to control inflation and to perform inflation targeting 
well. There is, however, a counterargument against the pass-through effect on inflation 
targeting. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) argued that an inflation targeting framework reduces 
the pass-through effect, in the sense that domestic agents are less inclined to change prices 
in response to a given exchange rate shock under the strong commitment of the monetary 
authority to price stability. 
                                                             
1 The essence of inflation targeting framework was clearly described in Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) 
and Bernanke et al. (1999), for instance. 
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Another possible difficulty for inflation targeting management in emerging market 
economies is the lack of credibility of the central bank capacity. It might come from 
arbitrary policy reactions accompanied with unreliable inflation forecasting by the central 
bank as well as the economic uncertainty and volatility. As long as agents do not believe 
that the monetary authority will be successful in achieving the inflation target, it will be 
difficult for inflation targeting to have any significant impact on the expectations and 
behavior of the private sector with respect to wage and pricing contracts. As Eichengreen 
(2002) emphasized, the lack of credibility would thus lessen inflation targeting 
performance. 
Some studies, among the limited literature, have assessed inflation targeting in 
emerging market economies as “conditional” success. For example, Mishkin (2000, 2004) 
argued that the success of inflation targeting could not be solely attributed to the actions 
of the central bank, and that supportive policies such as the absence of large fiscal deficits 
and rigorous regulation and supervision of the financial sector were crucial to its success. 
Lin and Ye (2009) also noted that the performance of inflation targeting could be affected 
by a country’s characteristics such as the government’s fiscal position, the central bank’s 
desire to limit movements of the exchange rate and its willingness to meet the 
preconditions of policy adoption. Ito and Hayashi (2004) presented the following two 
recommendations on inflation targeting management, considering the characteristics of 
emerging market economies: 1) emerging market countries should set an inflation with 
target central rate slightly higher and with a target range slightly wider than a typical 
advanced country; (2) small, open economies may pursue both an inflation target range 
and an implicit basket band in exchange rate regime, as both targets are expressed in a 
range (the targets work as the source of stability in expectations, while the ranges allow 
some flexibility). 
Thailand is not an exception in facing the aforementioned difficulties and conditional 
success in inflation targeting operation as one of emerging market economies. This article, 
in this context, reviews the monetary policy rule and its performance under inflation 
targeting framework focusing on Thailand. The study first estimates the policy reaction 
function to see if the adoption of inflation targeting has been linked with a monetary 
policy rule emphasizing on inflation stabilization. The study then investigates further 
whether the monetary policy rule would actually have its transmission effect on inflation, 
through tracing the impulse responses of inflation rate to monetary policy shocks in vector 
autoregressive (VAR) and structural VAR (SVAR) models. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the historical 
development of monetary policy framework in Thailand. Section 3 reviews previous 
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studies on the assessment of Thailand monetary policies and clarifies this paper’s 
contribution. Section 4 conducts the empirical analyses, describing the data, the 
methodology, and the estimation results and their interpretations. Section 4 summarizes 
and concludes. 
 
2. Development of Monetary Policy Framework in Thailand 
 
This section first describes the short history of the monetary policy framework after 
the second World War in Thailand, and then reviews the progress in inflation targeting 
setting since May 2000.2  
The long-term development of the monetary policy framework in Thailand can be 
divided into the following three periods. The first is the period of pegged exchange rate 
regime from the second World War to June 1997. Under this regime, The value of local 
currency named “bath” was pegged either to gold, a major currency, or a basket of 
currencies. The second is the period of monetary targeting regime from July 1997 to May 
2000. After the adoption of the floating exchange rate system on July 2, 1997, under the 
financial assistance program by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the crisis 
time, the Bank of Thailand targeted domestic money supply in such a way that the Bank 
set the daily and quarterly monetary base targets to stabilize financial markets. The third 
is the period of inflation targeting regime from May 2000 to present. Since the 
relationship between money supply and output growth became less stable over time after 
the financial crisis, the Bank adopted inflation targeting instead of monetary targeting in 
May 2000, together with the exit of the IMF program. At the same time, the Bank 
introduced the policy rate as an operational instrument for managing inflation targeting, 
so that the policy rate can affect real economy through transmission channels.  
The Bank of Japan has upgraded the framework of inflation targeting since its 
adoption in the following way (the process is displayed in Figure 1). At the initial stage 
from May 2000 to August 2009, the core-inflation target-range at between 0.0-3.5 percent 
was set based on the income ability of various groups of people and on the consistency 
with inflation of Thailand’s trading partners for keeping price competitiveness. The “core” 
inflation is expressed by the year-on-year percentage change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) that excludes fresh food and energy prices. The rationale for excluding these prices 
is that they are highly volatile in the short run as a result of factors beyond the control of 
monetary policy. The range target helps cushion temporary economic shocks and 
                                                             
2 The description of this section is based on the website of the Bank of Thailand. See: 
https://www.bot.or.th/English/MonetaryPolicy/MonetPolicyKnowledge/Pages/default.aspx 
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minimize the need for the authority to adjust monetary policy stances frequently. The core 
inflation rate had been assessed by not monthly but quarterly average to avoid the 
indicator’s volatility. 
The second stage from September 2009 to January 2015 narrowed the target range 
from 0.0-3.5 percent to 0.5-3.0 percent. The lower bound of the range was adjusted 
upwards by 0.5 percent to reduce the probability of deflation, while the upper bound was 
lowered by the same amount to signal no change in the overall monetary policy stance. 
At the current phase from January 2015 to present, the new target has been set for the 
annual average of headline inflation to be at 2.5 percent with a tolerance band of  ± 1.5 
percent. The rationale of adopting “headline” inflation instead of “core” inflation is that 
the headline inflation is better in reflecting more accurately the change in the cost of living, 
since it captures changes in prices of all goods and services in the CPI basket. Changing 
from the target range of 0.5-3.0 percent to point target at 2.5 percent with a band of ± 1.5 
percent gives a clearer policy signal to the public. The point target helps anchor long term 
inflation expectation more effectively, while the tolerate band provides some flexibility 
to absorb temporary shocks. Giving the forward-looking nature of monetary policy, the 
time horizon for targeting has expanded from quarterly to annual average which is better 
attuned with the 1-2 year time lag before the monetary policy gains its policy impact on 
the economy. 
 
3. Literature Review and Contributions 
 
This section reviews previous studies on the assessment of Thailand monetary policy 
and clarifies this paper’s contributions. We confine the reviews to the empirical studies 
with the sample data covering the period after 2005, namely the period enough to assess 
the inflation targeting of Thailand that was initiated in May 2000. The number of the 
reviewed articles would, therefore, be quite limited. The literature can be classified into 
the studies of monetary policy rule and those of policy transmission effect on inflation. 
Regarding the literature on monetary policy rule in Thailand, Hsing (2009) simply 
estimated monetary policy reaction functions for Thailand with the sample period from 
the first quarter of 1993 to the second quarter of 2007 as well as for Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines, and verified the existence of inflation-responsive rule in the 
contemporaneous manner. This study,  however,  focused only on the comparison of rules 
among four economies above, and did not imply any linkage with inflation targeting 
framework. Taguchi and Kato (2011) tried to evaluate the inflation targeting 
implementation for Thailand by examining its monetary policy rule with the sample 
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period from the second quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2009, together with the 
cases for Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines. By estimating a policy reaction function, 
the study identified the inflation-responsive but backward-looking monetary policy rule 
for Thailand. As the more recent study, Lueangwilai (2012) also analyzed monetary 
policy implementation under the inflation targeting in Thailand during the period from 
June 2000 to June 2011, by applying the Bayesian Maximum Likelihood estimation to a 
small, open economy model. The study considered exchange rate movement as a 
determinant factor of the policy rule and took into account the various types of the rule in 
the time horizon: contemporaneous, backward-looking and forward-looking. Its main 
finding was that the contemporaneous rule responding to inflation and exchange rate 
movement well characterized the policy rate set by the Bank of Thailand. 
As for the studies of policy transmission effect on inflation, Taguchi and Kato (2011)  
again, by confirming the inflation-responsive but backward-looking monetary policy rule  
under the inflation targeting in Thailand, investigated its policy effect on inflation during 
the same period from the second quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2009, and could 
not find any significant impulse response of inflation rate to a monetary policy shock. As 
the more recent studies for Thailand, Phiromswad (2015) and Arwatchanakarn (2017) 
examined monetary policy transmission mechanism by using structural VAR model, and 
found a policy channel to price level and output, respectively. Since the sample period of 
Phiromswad (2015) is from the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2011 and the 
one of Arwatchanakarn (2017) is from the third quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 
2014, however, their studies are not necessarily linked with the adoption of inflation 
targeting framework in Thailand. 
This study contributes to the reviewed literature above on the assessment of Thailand 
monetary policy as follows. First, this study updates the assessment of Thailand monetary 
policy with a focus on its inflation targeting by extending the sample period from the 
second quarter of 2000 (the starting time of inflation targeting) to the second quarter of 
2017. In particular, covering the period after 2015 as the analytical sample is significant 
enough to evaluate the inflation targeting, since the Bank of Thailand transformed its 
framework in January 2015 from the range target of 0.5-3.0 percent to the point target at 
2.5 percent with a band of ± 1.5 percent to provide a clearer policy signal to the public as 
mentioned in Section 2. Any of studies in the aforementioned literature did not cover this 
critical period for assessing the inflation targeting. Second, this study combines the 
analysis of monetary policy rule with the one of its transmission effect to provide a 
comprehensive evaluation for the inflation targeting. In the reviewed literature, it was 
only Taguchi and Kato (2011) that combined two kinds of analyses, whereas the other 
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studies dealt with them separately. In this sense, the major role of this study is to update 
Taguchi and Kato (2011) by including the new phase of the inflation targeting in Thailand 
as the sample period.  
 
4. Empirical Analyses 
 
This section conducts the empirical analyses in order to examine the monetary policy 
rule and its performance under inflation targeting framework focusing on Thailand. For 
examining the monetary policy rule, the study estimates the policy reaction function to 
see if the adoption of inflation targeting has been linked with an inflation-responsive 
monetary policy rule. The study then investigates further whether the monetary policy 
rule would actually have its transmission effect on inflation, through tracing the impulse 
responses of inflation rate to monetary policy shocks in VAR and SVAR models. 
The analyses here sample the quarterly data running from the second quarter of 2000 
to the second quarter of 2017 during which the Bank of Thailand has operated the inflation 
targeting and has also upgraded it. The source of all the data used for the subsequent 
estimations is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the international Monetary 
Fund (IMF).3 The analytical indicators are selected as follows: “Central Bank Policy Rate” 
for policy interest rate (denoted by por); “Consumer Prices Index (2010=100)” for price 
index, which is transformed into its year-on-year change rate as inflation rate for the 
estimation (π); “Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Volume, Seasonally Adjusted 
(2010=100)” for GDP, which is further processed into GDP gap (gap) by subtracting from 
the GDP a Hodrick-Prescott-filter of that series as a proxy of potential GDP level; and 
“National Currency per US Dollar, Period Average” for exchange rate, which is expressed 
as its year-on-year change rate (exr). The combination between policy interest rate and 
the other variables of inflation rate, GDP gap and exchange rate, are simply displayed in 
Figure 2. This observation itself does not tell us clear correlations and causalities in any 
combinations, and so should be statistically tested in the more sophisticated ways in the 
later sections. 
Before conducting the estimations below, we investigate the stationary property of 
the data for each variable, by employing the Ng-Perron unit root test 4  on the null 
hypothesis that each variable has a unit root in the test equation including “intercept”. 
This test constructs four test statistics: modified forms of Phillips and Perron (1988) 
                                                             
3 The data are retrieved from the website: http://www.imf.org/en/data.   
4 Ng and Perron (2001) introduced a new unit root test, which used detrended data and a lag selection 
procedure that improved on previous methods. 
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statistics (MZa, MZt), the Bhargava (1986) statistic (MSB), and the Point Optimal 
statistic (MPT). Table 1 reports the test results for the data for all the indicators, i.e.,  
policy interest rate (por) for its level data; and inflation rate (π), GDP gap (gap) and  
exchange rate (exr) for their level and first difference data. The test rejected a unit root in 
all the data at the conventional level of significance by more than 95 percent, thereby their 
data showing stationary property. Thus their data are justified to be used for the 
subsequent estimations. 
 
4.1 Policy Reaction Function 
 
The policy reaction function is one of the useful analytical tools to describe a 
monetary policy rule in practices managed by a central bank. Its standard specification is 
that a central bank adjusts the nominal policy interest rate in response to the gaps between 
expected inflation and output, and their respective targets. It can be interpreted as a more 
generalized rule of the Taylor rule (see Taylor, 1993) – the simple backward-looking 
reaction function. The estimable policy reaction functions were presented for the first 
time by Clarida and Gertler (1997) for Bundesbank monetary policy, Clarida et al. (1998a) 
for the US monetary policy, and Clarida et al. (1998b) for monetary policies of two sets 
countries: the G3 (Germany, Japan, and the US) and the E3 (UK, France, and Italy). 
Among them, Clarida et al. (1998b) demonstrated the most comprehensive estimation of 
policy reaction functions. For estimating the G3 monetary policy rules, they took the 
forward-looking specification as the baseline and the backward-looking function as the 
alternative for their comparison, and they found that the G3 pursued forward-looking 
rules, responding to anticipated inflation as opposed to lagged inflation. As for the E3 
estimation, they added such explanatory terms as German interest rate and exchange rate 
in their functions, to examine how the constraints of the European Monetary System that 
collapsed in late 1992 influenced the E3 monetary policy rules. 
This study applies the methodology of Clarida et al. (1998b) to estimate the policy 
reaction function for Thailand during the second period from quarter of 2000 to the second 
quarter of 2017. The analysis employs both of forward-looking and backward-looking 
specifications for the estimation, since emerging market economies including Thailand 
may face the difficulties in forecasting inflation rate  as Eichengreen (2002) suggested. In 
fact, the previous studies such as Taguchi and Kato (2011) and Lueangwilai (2012) 
identified backward-looking and contemporaneous rules for the Thailand monetary policy. 
The analysis also includes the exchange rate term as one of the monetary policy 
determinants, since emerging market economies including Thailand may fall into a “fear 
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of floating” as Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggested. 
The original policy reaction function presented by Clarida et al. (1998b) is shown as 
the following equation (1). 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = ?̅? + β ∗ (𝐸[𝜋𝑡+𝑛|𝛺𝑡] − 𝜋
∗) + γ ∗ (𝐸[𝑦𝑡|𝛺𝑡] − 𝑦𝑡
∗)   (1) 
 
where 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗  is a target for the nominal short-term interest rate; ?̅?  is the long-run 
equilibrium nominal interest rate; 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 is the inflation rate at the period t+n; 𝑦𝑡 is the real 
output, 𝜋∗  and 𝑦𝑡
∗  are respective bliss points for inflation and real output; E is the 
expectation operator; and Ω is the information available to the central bank at the time 
when it sets the interest rate. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten for empirical specification by defining α ≡ ?̅? − 𝛽𝜋∗ 
and 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗, and by replacing the unobserved forecast variables with realized 
variables as follows. 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = α + β ∗ 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 + γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡      (2) 
 
where 𝜀𝑡 is a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation and real output. Then 
the equation (2) is modified in accordance with our analytical concerns into the forward-
looking specification in equation (3) and the backward-looking specification in equation 
(4), and the equation (3) and (4) also include the exchange rate term, exr, as follows. 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = α + β ∗ 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 + γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 n =1,2,3 and 4  (3) 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = α + β ∗ 𝜋𝑡−𝑛 + γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 n =0,1,2 and 3  (4) 
 
The equation (3) and (4) are further modified for obtaining estimable equations since the 
central bank tends to conduct smooth changes in its policy interest rate in their practices. 
By assuming that the actual rate partially adjusts to the target as 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∗
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ + 𝜌 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡 where ρ is the degree of smoothing with 0 < ρ < 1 and υ is the 
disturbance term, equations (3) and (4) can be further rewritten into equation (5) and (6) 
as follows. 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)α + (1 − 𝜌)β ∗ 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 + (1 − 𝜌)γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (5) 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)α + (1 − 𝜌)β ∗ 𝜋𝑡−𝑛 + (1 − 𝜌)γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (6) 
 
For the technique to estimate the parameter vector [α, β, γ, δ, ρ], we adopt generalized 
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method of moments, since the equations above entail endogeneity problem in that the 
policy interest rate may also affect explanatory variables. The instrumental set includes 
one- and two-quarter lagged values of inflation rate π, GDP gap gap, and exchange rate 
exr, in the estimation equation (5) and (6). The J-statistic implies that these instrumental 
variables are valid in the sense that the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected in 
the models above except for the case of 𝜋𝑡+4 (see Table 2).  
Table 2 reports the estimation outcomes of policy reaction functions in two kinds of 
specifications: the forward-looking specification in the equation (5) and the backward-
looking specification in the equation (6). Based on the estimated short-term coefficients 
in the equations of (5) and (6), the long-term coefficients are worked out in the equations 
of (3) and (4), which are displayed in the lower part of each table. When we focus on the 
long-term coefficients, the cases of  𝜋𝑡+2 and 𝜋𝑡+3 are excluded from their calculations, 
since the degree of smoothing ρ is beyond unity, which is against our expectation. It is in 
the cases of 𝜋𝑡+1 and 𝜋𝑡 that the coefficient of inflation β is positively discernable at the 
conventional significant level. We herein identify the case of 𝜋𝑡+1, the forward-looking 
specification with one quarter ahead, as the most suitable specification for the Thailand 
policy reaction function, since the inflation coefficient has the higher significance by 
more than 99 percent and its magnitude is large enough to exceed unity by 1.966. In that 
case, we also confirm the significance at 95 percent level in the coefficient of exchange 
rate δ, but not in the coefficient of GDP gap.  
We interpret the estimation results above as follows. First, the Bank of Thailand 
appears to have adopted the inflation-responsive and forward-looking (one quarter ahead) 
monetary policy rule under its inflation targeting framework. This finding is much 
different from the previous studies such as Taguchi and Kato (2011) and Lueangwilai 
(2012) that identified backward-looking and contemporaneous rules for Thailand 
monetary policy. The difference might come from the fact that this study’s estimation  
covers the period after 2015 when the Bank of Thailand has upgraded its inflation 
targeting framework by transforming it from range target to point target to provide a 
clearer policy signal to the public as mentioned in Section 2. Second, the Thailand 
inflation-responsive rule is countercyclical enough to affect real interest rate, since the 
magnitude of the response to inflation is more than unity. This countercyclical rule seems 
to be similar to those of advanced economies; the magnitude of the Bank of Thailand in 
this study, 1.966, is comparable to those of the Bundesbank (1.31), the Bank of Japan 
(2.04) and the Federal Reserve System in USA (1.79). This study’s magnitude is also 
consistent with that of the previous study, for instance, 1.969 in Taguchi and Kato (2011). 
Third, the Thailand monetary policy rule is also responsive to exchange rate movement. 
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It might reflect the fact that the Bank of Thailand has still taken a role to avoid the excess 
of volatility of the value of the baht, particularly resulting from speculative capital flow, 
through the intervention in foreign exchange market, even under the inflation targeting 
regime.5 The exchange-rate responsive rule seems to be related to the problem of “fear of 
floating” in emerging market economies including Thailand. This rule is also consistent 
with the one that Lueangwilai (2012) described as responding to inflation and exchange 
rate movement. Lastly, it should be noted that the adjustment speed of a policy interest 
rate toward its target rate in the operation of the Bank of Thailand is slower than those in 
central banks in advanced economies. The smoothing speed ρ for Thailand is 0.927 in 
“quarterly” base, whereas the “monthly” smoothing speed is 0.91 for the Bundesbank;  
0.93 for the Bank of Japan, and 0.92 for the Federal Reserve System, respectively. The 
Thailand adjustment speed is, thus, about one-third of those in the G3 countries. 
To sum up, the Thailand monetary policy rule under the inflation targeting is 
characterized as an inflation- and exchange-rate- responsive rule with forward-looking 
manner (one quarter ahead), which is countercyclical against inflation in the long run, but 
is accompanied with slow adjustment toward a target policy rate. 
 
4.2 Policy Transmission Effect on Inflation 
 
This section examines whether the Thailand monetary policy rule would actually have 
its transmission effect on inflation, through tracing the impulse responses of inflation rate 
to monetary policy shocks in VAR and structural VAR (SVAR) models. The ordinary VAR 
model was traditionally used for examining the effects of monetary policy shocks, for 
instance, by Christiano et al. (1996). It was also applied to investigating economic impacts 
of the Thailand monetary policy shocks (e.g., Taguchi and Kato, 2011).  Then, the VAR 
model has been developed into the SVAR model under the assumption that the concerned 
variables should be contemporaneously and dynamically interdependent. The SVAR has 
become more popular than the ordinary VAR, since theoretical and empirical grounds can 
be incorporated for imposing the restrictions on the model. Christiano et al. (1999), for 
instance, applied the SVAR to examining the effects of monetary policy shocks, and 
Phiromswad (2015) and Arwatchanakarn (2017) also utilized the SVAR for the analyses 
of Thailand monetary policy. 
This study adopts the same four variables as in the policy reaction function for the 
model construction: policy interest rate (por), inflation rate (π), GDP gap (gap) and 
                                                             
5 The description of this sentence is based on the website of the Bank of Thailand. See: 
https://www.bot.or.th/English/MonetaryPolicy/MonetPolicyKnowledge/Pages/ExchangeRate.aspx 
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exchange rate (exr), since the variables here should be consistent with those used in the 
policy reaction function so that the implementation and performance of the Thailand 
inflation targeting can be simultaneously examined. The variables in this study are 
confined to the four indicators above, also because the purpose of this study is not to deal 
directly with the transmission channels and mechanisms inside of the Thailand monetary 
markets. The study also uses the modified version of variables through first difference 
except for policy interest rate: d(π), d(gap) and d(exr), in order to investigate a “marginal” 
effect of monetary policy shocks 
We start to specify an equation for the ordinary VAR estimation in the following way. 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 +  𝑉𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡      (7) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡  is a column vector of the endogenous variables with year t, i.e., 𝑦𝑡 =
 (𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝜋𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡  𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡)
′ for examining an ordinary policy transmission effect, and 𝑦𝑡 =
 (𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑑(𝜋𝑡) 𝑑(𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡) 𝑑(𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡))
′  for examining a marginal transmission effect; 𝜇  is a 
constant vector; 𝑉 is a coefficient matrix; 𝑦𝑡−1 is a vector of the lagged endogenous 
variables; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the random error terms in the system. The lag length (-1) 
is selected by the Schwarz information criterion with maximum lag being equal to (-2) 
under the limited number of observations from the second quarter of 2000 to the second 
quarter of 2017. 
Based on the VAR model estimation above, we examine the impulse responses of 
inflation rate to the shock of policy interest rate in terms of ordinary and marginal 
transmission effects. In examining the impulse response, the structural policy shock 
should be identified by applying the SVAR model under the assumption of the 
contemporaneous relationship among the sampled four variables. For that purpose, there 
are several approaches to impose the restrictions to identify structural shocks: short-run 
restriction and long-run restriction. This study, as in Christiano et al. (1999), adopts the 
short-run restriction by assuming the existence of time-lag for policy reaction so that 
policy rate can keep a recursive linkage with inflation rate, GDP gap and exchange rate. 
The impulse responses of inflation to the structural shock of policy rate under the SVAR 
are also presented together with the ordinary impulse responses. 
Table 3 and Figure 3 respectively report the estimation outcomes of VAR model and 
the impulse responses of inflation rate to the ordinary and structural shocks of policy rate 
with 95 percent error bands over a 8-quarter horizon, in terms of ordinary and marginal 
transmission effects. According to the ordinary transmission effect, inflation rate does not 
respond significantly to the policy-rate shock in the VAR model, and it responds even 
13 
 
positively to the structural shock of policy-rate during the initial four quarters under the 
SVAR model. As for the marginal transmission effect, inflation rate responds negatively 
to the policy-rate shock from the beginning quarter in the VAR model and from the fifth 
quarter in the SVAR model. The results of impulse response analyses, therefore, imply 
that the Thailand monetary policy under inflation targeting has only a marginal 
transmission effect on inflation. It might be probably because the Thailand monetary 
policy rule is accompanied with slow adjustment toward a target policy rate, although the 
rule is found to be inflation-responsive, forward-looking and countercyclical against 
inflation. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article reviewed the Thailand monetary policy rule and its performance under 
the adoption of inflation targeting regime since 2000. The study estimated the policy 
reaction function to see if the inflation targeting has been linked with an inflation-
responsive monetary policy rule, and investigated whether the monetary policy rule 
would actually have its transmission effect on inflation, through tracing the impulse 
responses of inflation rate to monetary policy shocks in vector autoregressive (VAR) and 
structural VAR models. The study contributed to the literature by updating the assessment 
of the Thailand monetary policy through covering the period after 2015, when the Bank 
of Thailand has upgraded its inflation targeting framework by transforming it from range 
target to point target to provide a clearer policy signal to the public. 
The main findings were as follows. First, the estimation outcomes of the policy 
reaction function showed that the Thailand monetary policy rule under the inflation 
targeting is characterized as an inflation- and exchange-rate- responsive rule with 
forward-looking manner. The identified progress in the Thailand monetary policy toward 
forward-looking rule might reflect the upgrading in the inflation targeting regime from 
range target to point target since 2015. Second, the estimation results also demonstrated 
that the Thailand monetary policy rule is countercyclical against inflation in the long run, 
but is accompanied with slow adjustment toward a target policy rate. Third, the results 
from the impulse response analyses suggested that the Thailand monetary policy under 
the inflation targeting has only a marginal transmission effect on inflation probably due 
to the slow adjustment of policy rate.  
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Figure 1 Progress in Inflation Targeting Framework 
 
Source: Author’s description based on the website of the Bank of Thailand 
 
Table 1 Unit Root Test 
 
Note: ***, ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99% and 95% level of significance. 
Sources: IFS of IMF 
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Figure 2 Observation of Analytical Indicators 
 
Source: IFS of IMF 
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Table 2 Policy Reaction Functions 
 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%,95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: IFS of IMF 
Forward-looking πt+1 πt+2 πt+3 πt+4
(1-ρ )*α
-0.121
(-0.745)
-0.456
(-1.569)
-0.423
(-1.197)
0.688
(0.983)
(1-ρ)*β
0.143 ***
(3.820)
0.080 *
(1.904)
0.077 *
(1.914)
-0.044
(-1.338)
(1-ρ)*γ
0.001
(0.044)
0.053
(0.644)
0.110
(1.428)
0.118
(1.441)
(1-ρ)*δ
0.017 **
(2.392)
0.014
(1.104)
0.015
(1.327)
-0.006
(-0.304)
ρ
0.927 ***
(12.051)
1.150 ***
(10.094)
1.138 ***
(8.180)
0.721 ***
(2.728)
J-statistics
2.802
(0.246)
2.359
(0.307)
2.935
(0.230)
4.622 *
(0.099)
Long-term Coefficients
α -1.667 - - 2.470
β 1.966 *** - - -0.160
γ 0.027 - - 0.426
δ 0.246 ** - - -0.023
Backward-looking πt πt-1 πt-2 πt-3
(1-ρ )*α
0.043
(0.195)
0.107
(0.698)
0.267 *
(1.795)
0.555 **
(2.204)
(1-ρ)*β
0.089 **
(2.270)
0.033
(0.897)
0.050
(0.945)
0.081
(1.574)
(1-ρ)*γ
-0.010
(-0.269)
0.029
(0.520)
0.068
(1.453)
0.153 **
(2.094)
(1-ρ)*δ
0.009
(1.049)
0.003
(0.386)
0.003
(0.311)
0.006
(0.474)
ρ
0.900 ***
(7.125)
0.922 ***
(12.467)
0.834 ***
(8.894)
0.689 ***
(4.743)
J-statistics
2.555
(0.278)
2.201
(0.332)
2.562
(0.227)
0.453
(0.797)
Long-term Coefficients
α 0.440 1.387 1.612 * 1.789 **
β 0.895 ** 0.430 0.302 0.262
γ -0.107 0.380 0.415 0.493 **
δ 0.092 0.050 0.020 0.020
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Table 3 VAR Model Estimation 
[Ordinary Transmission Effect] 
 
[Marginal Transmission Effect] 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%,95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: IFS of IMF 
 
  
por π gap exr
por (-1 )
0.823 ***
(15.049)
-0.186
(-1.034)
0.063
(0.268)
-0.710
(-1.229)
π (-1 )
0.090 **
(3.116)
0.795 ***
(8.322)
-0.063
(-0.507)
0.337
(1.102)
gap (-1 )
0.011
(0.407)
0.114
(1.236)
0.456 ***
(3.738)
0.155
(0.522)
exr (-1 )
0.003
(0.535)
-0.042 *
(-1.735)
-0.040
(-1.252)
0.847 ***
(10.829)
C
0.210 *
(1.881)
0.866 **
(2.349)
-0.040
(-0.083)
0.772
(0.653)
adj. R^2 0.883 0.676 0.225 0.682
por d(π) d (gap ) d (exr )
por (-1 )
0.949 ***
(22.942)
-0.262 **
(-1.981)
-0.144
(-0.717)
0.089
(0.199)
d (π )(-1 )
0.121 ***
(3.439)
0.371 ***
(3.277)
0.199
(1.161)
-0.142
(-0.372)
d (gap )(-1 )
0.007
(0.288)
0.039
(0.461)
-0.329 **
(-2.528)
0.098
(0.339)
d (exr )(-1 )
0.000
(0.014)
-0.045
(-1.208)
-0.068
(-1.187)
0.323 **
(2.529)
C
0.118
(1.127)
0.588 *
(1.744)
0.325
(0.636)
-0.289
(-0.254)
adj. R^2 0.886 0.195 0.050 0.042
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Figure 3 Impulse Responses 
[Ordinary Transmission Effect] 
 
 
[Marginal Transmission Effect] 
 
 
Note: The dotted lines denote a 95 percent error band over 8-year horizons. 
Source: IFS of IMF 
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